The 1997 financial crisis turns out to be a major turning point in the history of Korean chaebols. The post-crisis corporate reform has resulted in a dramatic change in the landscape of chaebols as about one half of the top 30 chaebols changed their names after the crisis.
Introduction
The 1997 crisis of Korea prompted the government to carry out restructuring in the corporate sector to restore its health and competitiveness. Its strategy consisted of promoting competition and improving corporate governance, capital structure, and profitability (Chopra et al. 2002 , Keun Lee 2002 . To bring about greater competition in the corporate sector, the government liberalized the domestic capital market and made it easier for Korean companies to access foreign capital. To improve corporate governance, it introduced a number of measures making the corporate balance sheet more transparent, improve the accounting standards in line with international best practices, and require independent external audits, full disclosure, and the provision of consolidated statements for business conglomerates. And to improve capital structure and profitability, the government pushed corporations to reduce their debt levels, increase their equity investment, and eliminate crosssubsidization of weaker affiliates.
A number of years have passed since the crisis and since Korea undertook various policy and institutional reforms in its wake. With this passage of time we are now in a position to review and evaluate what these reforms have accomplished. In this chapter we briefly summarize the post-crisis reform measures and then examine if and how the financial aspect of the chaebol organizations has changed after the financial crisis. To the latter end, we focus on the performance of chaebol as internal capital market.
1 Specifically, we explore whether internal capital markets have operated prior to the 1997 crisis and how the post-crisis corporate governance reform has affected the operation of internal capital markets.
1 Internal capital market in a very broad sense includes within-group transfers, within-group credit markets, and within-group equity market, among others.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes specific reforms in the corporate sector. Section 3 describes an empirical framework to test the effects of corporate reform on the operation of the internal capital market within chaebols and discusses the data used for our analysis. Section 4 discusses the estimation results regarding the operation of internal capital markets and its structural changes after the 1997 financial crisis. Section 5 concludes.
Corporate Reform after the 1997 financial crisis

Restructuring of Troubled Chaebols
Corporate restructuring already emerged as a key policy issue several months prior to the onset of the financial crisis because of the bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel Company in early 1997. The financial crisis dramatically increased the number of firms that had to be restructured. Among the top 63 chaebols with corporate debt of 250 billion won or more, 30
were forced to undertake some form of corporate restructuring (Table 1) . The restructuring, however, was slow to gain momentum because troubled firms and their creditors both tried to protect their own interests. The management of the troubled firms had strong incentives not to disclose accurate information on financial status as it wanted to maintain management control as well as attract financial support and avoid harsh restructuring measures. The creditors, which had been suffering from large non-performing loans (NPLs) and capital erosion, also had an incentive to apply lenient accounting standards to their client firms in order to meet the capital adequacy requirement.
Realizing a potentially serious negative impact from a massive wave of bankruptcies, the government responded by mobilizing public funds to expedite the restructuring of troubled firms. introduced for the critical steps in the proceedings such as the decision on stay, the report of debts and equities, and the approval of a reorganization plan. Fourth, the 1999 Amendment further provides that the court send reorganization cases to the liquidation procedure in case they fail to proceed in an orderly manner. In addition, the Composition Act was amended in 1998 prohibiting large firms with complicated capital structures from allowing them to enter composition and thus preventing the abuse of the composition procedure. This appears to have had a salutary effect, as shown by the fact that the firms in the 1998 cohorts that entered both corporate reorganization and composition out-performed those in their 1997 counterpart 
Reform in Corporate Governance
In February 1998, the Kim Dae Jung administration proposed a series of corporate reforms designed to enhance transparency, stop cross debt guarantees, improve financial structure, streamline business activities, and strengthen accountability. In addition, three measures were implemented to enhance corporate governance-the separation of bank from industrial capital, restriction of intra-group investment and illegal internal transactions among groupaffiliated firms, and prohibition of illegal bequest of family ownership.
Measures to strengthen accountability of owners/managers are also in the works. In To protect the minority shareholders right, various measures have been introduced.
Thresholds for various initiatives were lowered when they involve the removal of a director, and the right to file a derivative suit and to inspect account books. These measures were designed to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by dominant shareholders and mangers. In addition, a cumulative voting system was introduced in June 1999 in order to enable minority shareholders to elect a director, who would best represent their interests.
In this new system, shareholders with less than 3 percent of the outstanding stocks will be able to make a claim for cumulative voting. This is not, however, mandatory and most of the listed chaebol member firms have amended their charters to prevent cumulative voting.
The changes of minority shareholders' rights are summarized in Table 3 .
As can be seen in Table 3 , Korea's institutional and legal framework has been overhauled to improve corporate governance. According to a study by the Korea Development Institute, which examined corporate governance, Korea scored an overall score of 0.8 out of 1.0, just slightly below the U.S. score of 0.89 (Table 4 ). Korea's corporate governance scored highest in accountability of managers through shareholders rights, establishment of a market for corporate control and holding controlling shareholders legally liable. Furthermore, Korea scored relatively well in the areas of disclosure and audit. We should note, however, that the enforcement index is much less than the institutional index in all categories, suggesting that the newly established rules and regulations are yet to be effectively enforced. Although it goes without saying that more work is needed in improving corporate governance in Korea, there are signs that the reform effort so far has resulted in some real improvements. For instance, the market seems to be rewarding companies with good 1998 , Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2005 show that an overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in explaining these firms' market values, measured by Tobin's q. Another sign is that, according to a survey (Kim, Kim, and Kim 2000) , the influence of the chair decreased from 40.3 percent in 1992 to 32.5 percent in 1999 and CEOs voice became more important in selecting board directors in 1999 than in 1992 (Figure 2) . Further, the proportion of CEOs directly relate to the founders decreased significantly from 30 percent in 1992 to 5 percent in 1999 with an overwhelming share of CEOs being recruited from within the firm (77.5%). Although this is a sign that there has been a significant improvement in recruiting and promoting "professional managers,"
questions remain as to whether it has led to any measurable decrease in the influence of the founder's family, as the founder's family can "effectively" manage the chaebol with even less than 4% ownership.
<Figure 2> Selection of the Board Directors (1992, 1999) Kim, Kim, Kim (2001) Korea has undertaken a major restructuring of its corporate sector since the 1997 crisis. A number of chaebols have been dissolved, the average debt-to-equity ratios of listed companies have been significantly reduced, and transparency and corporate governance have improved with accounting and auditing standards being brought close to international best practices. Underlying the government's effort to reform the corporate sector has been the idea that the strong market discipline and not government intervention should lead the restructuring process. Thus creditors and shareholders are now empowered to monitor corporate governance; more rigorous bank accounting standards are in place; an M&A market has actively been promoted, and the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act was enacted to facilitate coordination among creditor institutions in corporate debt restructuring processes.
Questions have been raised, however, regarding the wisdom of imposing the so-called global standards in corporate governance in Korea. Jwa (2003) doubts whether the global standards, which are in fact the Anglo-American standards, will work effectively in Korea, a country that differs from the West in history, culture, and institutions. A similar concern was raised by Keun Lee (2003) , who found that soon after the crisis Korea had succeeded in bringing about changes in the areas where targets for reform could readily be quantified as in outside directors in the board and the debt ratio but had yet to see improvements in the actual workings of the board of directors and corporate governance in general. These relate to person-to-person relations where informal institutions such as culture and the "habits and mindsets" of the actors play an important role. 
The Effects of Corporate Reform : Empirical Framework and Data
Corporate restructuring has resulted in a sea change in the landscape of Korean chaebols with more than one half of the top 30 chaebols were replaced with new members.
Corporate governance reform also led to a dramatic change at least in tangible institutions and regulations. As indicated by a significant gap between institution and enforcement index reported in Table 4 , however, it remains to be seen if the governance reform has indeed produced the intended effects on chaebols' behavior. What are the effects of the post-crisis corporate governance reform? What evidence do we have regarding the effects of the governance reform? In this section, we explore these questions.
Our analysis is closely related to Lee, Park and Shin (2009) Samphantharak develops a structural model of investment by business groups assuming costly external finance and tests the implication of the model for the emergence of internal capital markets in business groups by using Thailand data.
Following these works, we estimate an investment equation for chaebol firms and test if the post-crisis corporate reform has a systemic effect on chaebol's investment decision.
The baseline specification of our regression equation is characterized as follow:
where subscripts i, j and t are used to denote business group, individual firm, and the time period, respectively. I, Q, LV and OC represent investment, Tobin's q (or industry q for non-listed firms), financial leverage, and the firm's own cash flow, respectively. DL is a dummy for listed firms while DF is a dummy for business groups that own financial intermediaries as a subsidiary. Constant terms include year, business group, and industry dummies. These dummies are expected to capture the business group specific factors and common macroeconomic effects.
While the specification is similar in many respects to those of Lee, Park and Shin or Samphantharak, it departs from them in several important ways. First, we include not only listed firms but also non-listed firms in our sample. We suspect that internal capital markets within chaebols may have played a particularly important role in channeling financial resources to non-listed firms where ownership is far more concentrated than listed firms. In this respect, focusing only on listed firms may fall short of identifying the full effect of postcrisis reform on chaebols' changing behavior. Second, we examine if the ownership of within-group financial intermediaries helps in any systematic way the operation of internal capital markets and ultimately the investment decision. If the post-crisis corporate reform has the intended effect and, as a result, the role of internal capital markets has weakened, the ownership of within-group financial intermediaries should have a significantly weaker effect on chaebols' investment once other determinants are adequately controlled.
We measure investment (I) by capital expenditure (calculated from the cash flow table of a firm) rather than a change in the fixed assets (as used by Samphantharak). The definition of capital expenditure used in our study is close to that of COMPUSTAT capital expenditures, and includes net expenditures for tangible assets including machines, vehicles & transport, tool & fixtures, assets in construction, and other tangible assets. We believe that use of the simple change in the fixed assets for investment is highly inadequate because it involves asset revaluations and depreciation that had been actively undertaken after the 1997 crisis (Lim, 2008) . To control for size, we normalize capital expenditures by the stock of fixed asset at the beginning of the year.
For independent variables, the firm's own cash flow (OC) is defined as net profits scaled by the stock of fixed asset at the beginning of the year. Tobin's q is constructed as the ratio of total market capitalization to the book-value of capital. This variable is widely used to capture firm-specific investment opportunity. For non-listed firms for which no stock price data is available, we use the industry q as a proxy for Tobin's q where the industry q is computed as a simple average of Tobin's q of listed firms in the same industry to which the specific non-listed firm belongs. Finally, financial leverage (LV) is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets.
The coefficients of our interest are those associated with the interaction terms denoted by 1 γ and 2 γ . The two dummy variables, DL and DF, are interacted with OC to distinguish between listed and non-listed firms and between business groups with or without financial intermediaries. We expect that 1 0 γ > and 2 0 γ < . Listed firms are typically better monitored than non-listed firms and also subject to stock exchange regulations on minority shareholder rights. As a result, listed firms would face greater difficulty in transferring financial resources across affiliated firms and thus are likely to depend less on internal capital markets but more on its own cash flow in investment financing ( 1 0 γ > ).
Regarding the sign of 2 γ , our prior reflects the view that the ownership of financial intermediaries facilitates the functioning of internal capital markets helping relax the 20 financing constraint of other subsidiaries. Consequently, investment is likely to be less sensitive to the own cash flow if the firm is a subsidiary of a chaebol that owns financial intermediaries ( 2 0 γ < ).
Given these priors, our key hypothesis about the effect of the post-crisis corporate reform is summarized as follows:
• 0 γ and 2 γ should be smaller in absolute value for the post-crisis period We use firm-level data from the database of the Korea Information Service (KIS).
KIS data contains comprehensive financial information regarding not only firms listed in the
Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) but also non-listed firms that are required to be externally audited. Our study covers the period 1994-2008. The sample period excludes the years 1997 and 1998 to disregard the abnormal investment behavior during the transition period around the financial crisis. Although the KIS database includes firms listed both in the KSE and KOSDAQ stock markets, we exclude firms listed in the KOSDAQ market since their firm characteristics and behavior are quite different from those of chaebol firms.
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Business groups are defined based on ownership and managerial control. Firms are in the same group if they are (wholly or partly) owned and managed by the same individual or the same group of individuals such as a family. To identify groups, we use the information from KIS. In constructing the sample of firms affiliated with groups, we define groups as those that have existed every year for the whole sample period during 1994-2008 with at least five externally-audited affiliates within the group. We exclude all of those who underwent corporate rehabilitation procedures as well as those who became the new chaebols 5 as a result of chaebols' spin-off (separation) after the 1997 crisis. Accordingly, a total number of business groups or chaebols in our sample is 29. The basic picture remains the same in the post-crisis period. All coefficients of our interest are statistically significant and of the expected sign. More important is that all coefficients support our hypothesis. Specifically, investment becomes generally less sensitive to own cash flow during the post-crisis period, reflecting the increased availability of cheaper external finance. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction term for listed firms is larger than the same coefficient reported in Panel A. Finally, the ownership of financial intermediaries has weaker effect on investment than in the pre-crisis period.
Empirical Results
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Collecting these results imply that the post-crisis corporate reform has had its intended effects but the effects are not as dramatic as argued by Lee, Park and Shin (2009) .
Rather, our results suggest that internal capital markets of chaebols are still at work at least for non-listed firms although much weaker than before. In this light, our results appear more consistent with the study by the Korea Development Institute that documents significant gap between institution and enforcement (Table 4) . 
Conclusion
The 1997 financial crisis turns out to be a major turning point in the history of Korean chaebols. The post-crisis corporate reform has resulted in a dramatic change in the landscape of chaebols as about one half of the top 30 chaebols changed their names after the crisis. The reform was swift and unprecedented in its comprehensiveness encompassing a wide range of structural changes in the financial structure and corporate governance of chaebols. Improved transparency and strengthened shareholder rights helped chaebols to have greater access to cheaper external finance made available by capital market opening.
Nevertheless, the corporate reform is an ongoing process in Korea with full effects yet to be seen. Our empirical findings suggest that the role of internal capital markets has faded out after the crisis but not fully yet. Investment by non-listed chaebol firms remains fairly insensitive to the own cash flow if the firm belongs to a chaebol that owns financial intermediaries. The positive effect of corporate reform appears to have been felt asymmetrically between non-listed firms whose ownership is more concentrated and listed firms that are now subject to more stringent international standards and monitoring by shareholders. These findings imply that key policy challenges in the future are to eliminate the gap between de jure institution and de facto enforcement standards. 
